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Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

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
Tuesday, 29 February 2000

National Security Information

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INTERNATIONAL

International: *Analytic Perspective*

Proliferation Will Worsen in New Decade

Many states in the next 10 years will find it easier to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems because of the growing availability of technology and information, a perceived erosion of control regimes, and the emergence of secondary suppliers. Export controls at most will slow and increase the costs of clandestine procurement programs.

- The potential for surprise will grow as proliferants apply lessons learned from Iraq, North Korea, and India to frustrate international inspectors and to avoid detection of nuclear test preparation.

Pakistan, India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria—as well as Russia and China—will have the most active WMD and missile programs for the next several years. A significant risk exists that Taiwan and South Korea will try to expand their capabilities and that Saudi Arabia or Japan may initiate WMD programs if they perceive arms control regimes and US security guarantees are eroding.

Spread of CW and BW Programs

Russian efforts to develop new chemical agents to complicate or defeat Western defenses will pose the greatest CW threat from national programs. A growing body of [] indicates Third World countries, most notably Iran, are obtaining the technology behind these new CW agents.

- Determined proliferants will respond to increased scrutiny and political costs of CW programs by disguising their facilities, relying more on production mobilization capabilities, and moving toward leaner, more sophisticated arsenals of agents and weapons.
- Nonstate actors such as Usama Bin Ladin possess rudimentary but growing chemical and biological capabilities that pose a more immediate threat. []

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